“You’d Better Be Good”:
Congressional Threats of Removal Against Federal Judges
Marc O. DeGirolami1

The apparent state of relations [between Congress and the judiciary] is more tense than at
any time in my lifetime.2
When the political branches get involved in a specific case that’s pending before the
judge, or when the political branches start going after a judge or making threats in a way that
affects ongoing cases, that interference oversteps the line of judicial independence. The political
branches may well be right to stand that line and criticize judges. But they should not do so
while cases or issues are still pending before the judge. If they do so, and the criticism cuts so
deeply, as it may have done in the Bayless3 case, the best response is for the judge to step back
from the case and recuse himself. He should do so not because he is going to be influenced by
political threats, -- I think few judges are, and I don’t think Judge Baer was -- but because the
public perception is going to be that the latter decision -- whether to stick to his original decision
or to change his mind -- will have been the result of political pressure.4

The judicial branch has lately become the subject of an increasing and far ranging
scrutiny and distrust by its legislative counterpart. Congressional suspicion is often directed
toward judges’ traditional discretion in criminal sentencing and, more generally, the degree to
which judges are beholden to (and, therefore, exercise case-by-c ase judgment by reliance upon) a
particular ideological point of view or personal bias. The distrust has bred a potent strain of
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political opportunism which Congress has manifested in several recent bills. One of these, the
Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act,5 all but eliminates what was once the judge’s
province and tacitly threatens judges’ continued employment. Likewise, Congress is considering
legislation that would disavow citation in judicial opinions to foreign legal sources.6 The
consequences to maverick judges who disregard the congressional will about what should and
should not be written into American case law are not yet clear, but some in the House of
Representatives have already suggested that removal from office is a distinct and viable
possibility. There are frequent calls, particularly from certain voices in the House, for “judicial
accountability” for decisions that are controversial, politically debatable, or otherwise
purportedly not in keeping with popular opinion.
The natural progression of these tendencies may or may not be toward more frequent
impeachment of federal judges; it is probable, however, that the future holds more threats of
removal.7 This article explores the use of threats of removal against federal judges and why the
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incidence of these types of threats is likely to increase. In Part I, after presenting the textual
sources authorizing judicial removal, I survey briefly the history and quality of certain judicial
impeachments and threatened removals. In Part II, I examine two recent pieces of legislation,
the Feeney Amendment and House of Representatives Resolution 568 (which has not yet been
enacted), that serve as able vehicles for legislators to level threats of removal against judges for
noncompliance with certain political ideologies or objectives. In Part III, I ask what may explain
the increased prevalence of threats of removal by legislators against judges. In answer, I
advance two theories, the first of which posits that the threat of judicial removal is a perfectly
rational choice for legislators given the power structure between the branches as it has developed
in modern times; therefore, such threats will become an increasingly frequent occurrence even
though they are not necessarily followed by impeachment itself. The second explanatory theory
is based on the growing public perception (from within and outside the legal profession) of the
judiciary as incapable of performing its judging function credibly. I argue that some of the
traditional beliefs about the role of judges have been irremediably undermined by a culture that
deems criticism, in as great abundance as possible, a paramount virtue. I submit that the
legislature has capitalized on both the popularity of judicial criticism and the lack of public
confidence in the judiciary to advance its own political ends. These two theories, working in
conjunction, provide a basis for understanding the increased incidence of legislative threats of
removal against judges and for the belief that the present socio-political climate will conduce to
more frequent and forceful threats of removal in the future. After considering and rejecting
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several commonly voiced remedies for the current state of congressional and public hostility
toward the judiciary, I conclude in Part IV that the relationship between the legislative and
judicial branches will continue to deteriorate, and that congressional threats of removal will play
an increasingly central role in this failure.
I.

The Constitutional Text and Its Use
The authority to remove a federal judge from office traditionally has been interpolated

from (as it is not expressly located in)8 two characteristically vague constitutional provisions: (1)
All “civil Officers of the United States” are to be “removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”9; and (2) federal
judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behavior.”10 The Constitution sets out no other
particulars with respect to these sections, but does add in Article III that the “trial of all crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.”11 There are no other constitutional details
governing the conditions under which a federal judge may be removed.12
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Moreover, Congress has never undertaken, by act, constitutional Amendment, or
otherwise, to define or set the parameters encompassing the phrase “good behavior.”13 It has
likely never been one of Congress’s priorities. The impeachment armamentarium has been
brought to bear infrequently: from 1799 to the present, only sixteen persons have been tried by
the Senate on impeachment by the House, and only seven of those were removed from office.
Of that sixteen, however, twelve – 75% – have been federal judges, and seven have resulted in
removals from office.14 In contrast to the number of impeachment trials, however, there have
been fifty-eight judicial investigations by the House of Representatives (the first official act in
the impeachment chain).15 The two earliest judicial impeachment trials, those of Judge John
Pickering and Justice Samuel Chase, give the first glimpse of the political practicalities of
judicial removal. Judge Pickering’s impeachment was motivated in large measure by his
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debilitating senility and alcoholism.16 The four articles of impeachment leveled against him all
related to his decisions in a particular case and included a charge that his deportment on the
bench consisted of “ravings, cursings, and crazed incoherences.”17 The day after the removal of
Judge Pickering for incompetence (and only nominally, by his political adversaries, for high
crimes and misdemeanors), eight articles of impeachment were brought against Justice Chase.18
The majority of the charges against Chase were rooted in the perception of him (rightly, it
seems) as “impatient, overbearing, and at times arrogant,” but, with one notable exception, legal
historians have emphasized the role of Chase’s political enemies in calling for his
impeachment.19 The charges against Chase related to his decisions while on the bench: in one
case, preventing counsel from relying on relevant precedent; in another, refusing to excuse a
juror who had prejudged the case; in a third, tampering with a grand jury; and in a fourth,
delivering an inappropriate political speech to a jury.20 Justice Chase was impeached by the
House but acquitted by the Senate.
It has been observed that the impeachment and acquittal of Justice Chase “set a precedent
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that no judge would ever be removed for high-handed decisionmaking.”21 An alternative view,
however, is that the impeachment and acquittal of Justice Chase was the first threatened but not
consummated removal – the prototypical congressional response to the kind of judicial conduct
that, though perhaps not ultimately meriting removal in that it fails to qualify as a high crime or
misdemeanor, is controversial enough to draw the ire of political enemies in Congress. One
might characterize it as “bad behavior” – not impeachment-worthy but nevertheless deserving, in
the eyes of disapproving legislators, of some direct reaction. The next impeachment, that of
Judge James Peck, follows this model. Peck was charged with abuse of power for issuing a
contempt citation against and imprisoning a lawyer who had criticized him in a newspaper for
conduct that related specifically to Peck’s decisions in a particular case; Peck, too, was
impeached and acquitted (though by only one vote in the Senate).22 Likewise, “[h]igh-handed
decisionmaking was included among the articles of impeachment” against Judge Charles Swayne
(abuse of the contempt power) and Judge George English (“willfully, tyrannically, and
oppressively” disbarring lawyers).23 Judge Swayne was impeached and acquitted and Judge
English was impeached and resigned prior to his trial.24 The next judicial impeachment and
acquittal pattern, the case of Judge Harold Louderback, does not follow the model: Louderback
was impeached for engaging in financial improprieties and for bringing the bench into disrepute;
21
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he was subsequently acquitted.25
Most interesting for understanding the implications of the “bad behavior” model is the
case of Judge Harold Baer, Jr. In 1996, Judge Baer suppressed evidence of narcotics activity
based on a finding that the police had conducted an illegal search,26 and the government filed a
motion for reconsideration shortly thereafter. In that election year, Baer’s decision elicited an
immediate and violent response. More than two hundred members of Congress, led by
Representatives Bill McCollum, Fred Upton, and Michael Forbes, wrote President Clinton
decrying the decision and demanding that the President call for Judge Baer’s resignation.27
Former Senator Bob Dole, then the Republican presidential candidate, threatened Judge Baer
with impeachment and President Clinton (himself likely concerned about appearing “soft on
crime”) intimated that a forced resignation might be in the offing depending on the Judge’s
disposition of the motion for reconsideration.28 Judge Baer granted the motion.29
Judge Baer’s situation does not strictly fit the model for “bad,” but non-impeachable,
behavior that nevertheless draws an angry congressional response because Baer was not
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impeached and then acquitted. However, Baer’s decision to reverse himself created suspicion
that he had been intimidated by threats of removal (or forced resignation) if he did not do so.30
The incident also sparked the resurgence of friction between the judiciary and Congress about
what conduct merits removal. Responding to a joint statement issued by the Second Circuit
defending Judge Baer against threats of removal, former Senator Dole wrote:
You offer the opinion that “[a] ruling in a contested case cannot remotely be considered a
ground for impeachment.” Again, I must take exception. Only a few years ago, the
Supreme Court held that matters of impeachment are left by the Constitution to the
political branches of the federal government and that courts are powerless to review
impeachment decisions. It is thus for the Congress to decide what constitutes a proper
basis under the Constitution for impeaching federal judges.31
This statement is revealing in that it typifies Congress’ present approach when faced with
judicial conduct that may not be egregious enough for impeachment32 but nevertheless is felt to
demand some forceful, critical response. Professor Gerhardt has written that “the Article III
[“good behavior” clause] formula could sensibly be read either as (1) setting a substantive
standard of conduct on which judicial tenure is contingent, or as (2) employing an eighteenthcentury term of art to signal that federal judges shall hold tenure for life unless impeached, and,
thus, that the good behavior clause itself does not establish a separate or independent basis for
removal other than those specified in the impeachment clauses.”33 When confronted with likely
30
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unimpeachable but highly politically objectionable (for Dole) behavior, Dole made intentionally
murky the type of conduct that would qualify for impeachment by emphasizing Congress’
inviolable power to define such conduct at will. The implication of his position is an
endorsement of Gerhardt’s first alternative as the proper interpretation of the “good behavior”
clause. In fact, the inherent ambiguity of the “good behavior” standard and its meaning for
judicial tenure is a credible mechanism to support Congress’ insistence that the possible grounds
for impeachment are not capable of close definition, and depend more on particular legislative
whimsy.34 Thus, while actually impeaching a judge remains as complicated and lengthy a
process as ever, threatening a judge with impeachment, and thereby imposing the full heft of
political and public disapproval upon him, is both a viable and readily usable congressional
instrument of control over the judiciary.35 Whether or not Judge Baer (or anyone else) believed
that he would be impeached based on his disposition of the motion for reconsideration in
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Bayless, he may well have felt that his job security and his ability to function as a judge had been
compromised by the congressional threats against him.
II.

Recent Legislation That Enables Congressional Threats of Removal
As the previous section demonstrates, the meaning of “good behavior” and its role in

defining the scope of impeachable conduct has proven notoriously elusive. The amorphous
moral qualities adumbrated by the phrase put one in mind of the colorful statements of the
Roman historian Tacitus, who in relating the impeachments of A.D. 57, described those
convicted as “stained with the foulest guilt,” “audacious[ly] wicked[]” and “supported by corrupt
influence.”36
Of course, incompetence in the fulfillment of one’s juridical duties, as we have seen in
the example of Judge Pickering, is grounds for removal.37 And few would dispute that bribery,
extortion, and embezzlement of public funds are all examples of “bad” behavior.38 The grayer
shades come into focus when one considers an act that arguably violates “public rights and
duties” owed to society at large,39 or “which in some way corrupts or subverts the judicial or
governmental process,” or which is “plainly wrong in [itself] to a person of honor, or a good
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citizen.”40 With time, the frustrations and uncertainties of sorting out the ethical and semantic
nuances suggested by these phrases may well lead to cynicism41 or, as explored below, political
opportunism.
In part because of the absence of distinct and well-defined standards for assessing the
“goodness” or “badness” of a judge’s professional conduct, it has been possible for Congress to
craft legislation that substantially affects judicial power and discretion, and that also either itself
tacitly threatens judges with removal for noncompliance or provides a platform for
individualized and systematic threats of removal by legislators. The Feeney Amendment and
House of Representatives Resolution 568 are two examples of such legislation.
A.

The Feeney Amendment and Its Minatory Provisions

The Sentencing Reform Act of 198442 (SRA) and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines43 are
certainly nothing new, and it is undisputed that two of the primary motivations underlying the
Guidelines were the promotion of uniformity in sentencing and the creation of sentences

40
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proportionate to the crimes committed.44 The Guidelines themselves support these aims.45
Notwithstanding the substantial curtailment of judicial discretion in sentencing ushered in by the
Guidelines, Judge Bruce Selya has observed that even under the SRA
sentencing is not a matter of mere mechanics. The various adjustments to the base
offense level for specific offense characteristics and other factors depend upon a district
court’s determination of what conduct is relevant to the offense at issue – a matter
inviting district court discretion . . . . Similarly, district court discretion is summoned, like
a genie from a bottle, by the long list of factors to be considered in imposing a particular
sentence, and by the somewhat elastic contours of those factors. Finally, the departure
provisions play in the joints of the guidelines structure.46
It seems plausible enough that the SRA and the Guidelines stemmed in large measure
from the reasonable legislative impetus to promote consistency and diminish individual caprice
in federal sentencing. Those laudable purposes were tempered, however, by provisions of the
SRA permitting judges, in the (regulated) exercise of their discretion, to depart (upward or
downward) from the Guidelines range for various case-specific reasons.47 Some of these reasons
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were expressly deemed legitimate in all situations,48 while others depended on ad hoc judicial
assessments. Appellate courts were empowered to review sentencing departures and overturn
them if “unreasonable”,49 which the Supreme Court interpreted as appellate review for abuse-ofdiscretion.50
The advent of the Feeney Amendment, however, calls into doubt whether the motivations
of Congress today in controlling the sentencing process bear much resemblance to those of the
Congress that enacted the SRA in the mid-1980s. The Feeney Amendment (named after its
sponsor, first term Representative Tom Feeney of Florida, “who it appears had never before
expressed any interest or insight into sentencing, federal or otherwise”)51 was enacted as part of
the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT)
Act (or “Amber Alert”),52 whose essential purpose, the creation of a national reporting system

consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described.” The Policy Statement in the Guidelines explaining the operation of this section highlights the
continuing importance of judicial discretion in the context of departure: “Circumstances that may warrant departure
from the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed
in advance.”
48

E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (directing the Commission to “assure that the guidelines reflect the general
appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account a
defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation of prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense”).

49

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2).

50

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98-100 (1996) (“A district court’s decision to depart from the Guidelines . . .
will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing
court.”).

51

Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1241 (2004).

52

Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 667-676 (2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742). The Feeney Amendment
appears at section 401 of the PROTECT Act.
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for child kidnappings, has little obvious connection with regulating or curtailing the powers of
the judiciary.53
Nevertheless, the Feeney Amendment represents the greatest restriction of judicial
sentencing power since the SRA. The Feeney Amendment passed through two incarnations.
The first version (Feeney I) was attached, without any vetting by the House Judiciary
Committee, the Sentencing Commission, or anyone else in Congress, as a rider to the PROTECT
Act, and was passed by the House of Representatives with little discussion. Feeney I dispensed
with certain express grounds for downward departure (e.g., aberrant behavior, family ties, and
military service). But it also altogether eliminated the ad hoc category of downward departure,
limiting the grounds for departure to those selected factors explicitly listed in the Guidelines.54
Professor Zlotnick has observed that Feeney I’s wholesale abolition of judicial discretion in
sentencing may well have been catalyzed by the “Judge Rosenbaum Debacle.”55 But the
confrontation between the House Judiciary Committee and Judge Rosenbaum was, in many
ways, merely symbolic of the long-standing and pervasively suspiciousresentment among
several in the Committee and in Congress generally that too many judges are “soft on crime” and
overly prone to depart downward.56 Those suspicions created an opportunity for Congress to

53

See the statement of Senator Edward Kennedy (MA), expressing the view that the Feeney Amendment “ha[s]
nothing to do with children, and everything to do with handcuffing judges and eliminating fairness in our Federal
sentencing system.” 149 Cong. Rec. S6711 (May 20, 2003).

54

See David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing
Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 230 (2004).
55

Id. at 225. U.S. District Judge James M. Rosenbaum of Minnesota, a Reagan appointee and former U.S. Attorney,
offered various criticisms of drug sentences under the Guidelines before the House Judiciary Committee. In
response, he was accused by the Committee of disregarding the Guidelines on several occasions and was threatened
with a records subpoena.

56

Id. at 226.
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assert its power over the judiciary by implementing new rules that, as I will show below, tacitly
threaten judges’ job security.
The enacted version of the Feeney Amendment (Feeney II) reflects just that. Feeney II
eliminates judicial discretion with respect to unenumerated downward departures for crimes
involving pornography, sexual abuse, child sex, and child kidnapping and trafficking.57 It also
makes several substantive changes to sentencing practice as it had developed under the SRA,
imposing two categories of limitations on judicial discretion which I will call “direct” and
“minatory.” The “direct” limitations are the substitution of de novo appellate review for Koon’s
abuse-of-discretion standard58 and the requirement that a prosecutor make a motion for the last
point in a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.59 To be sure, these restrictions
weaken the discretionary power of judges, but they have few psychological overtones or
implications for judges. The de novo standard of review expresses a preference for greater intrajudicial scrutiny of downward departures; it probably will result in more reversals merely
because appellate judges will be freer to do as they will.60 Whether or not this occurs, the district
judge is merely on notice that his sentencing decisions, like the majority of his decisions in other
contexts (e.g., rulings on dispositive motions and essentially any issue of law at any stage in

57

PROTECT Act, § 401(a), (b), 117 Stat. 650, 667-68.

58

Id. at § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670-71.

59

Id. at § 401(g), 117 Stat. at 671.

60

I have some hesitation with Professor Zlotnick’s conclusion that de novo review will necessarily increase
ideologically-based reversals. He argues that “the increasingly conservative appointees on the Courts of Appeals are
less likely to agree with the district court judges in close cases.” Zlotnick, supra note 54, at 231. The present
administration has appointed notably conservative judges; another President’s appointees may be less so. There is
no reason to expect that, as a result of the de novo standard, the downward departure decisions of President Bush’s
appointees to the district court will be reversed by a future, more liberal President’s appointees to the court of
appeals.
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litigation), will be given greater appellate attention. But there is little reason to believe that this
finer review would strike fear in the hearts of district judges – de novo review is commonplace
and unremarkable for lower courts. Indeed, while it is undeniable that most judges prefer not to
be reversed, intense judicial peer review is an integral and vital component of the process.
Similarly, the requirement of a prosecutorial motion to consummate a substantial assistance
downward departure may curtail a judge’s authority, but it does no more than that. The motion
requirement does not forebode any unspoken consequence to the sentencing judge, such as, for
example, the loss of employment in response to a decision that displeases.
By contrast, the “minatory” limitations do portend such consequences. Feeney II requires
the Chief Judge of each district to submit to the Sentencing Commission “a written report of the
sentence; the offense for which it is imposed; the age, race, sex of the offender; and information
regarding several factors made relevant by the guidelines.”61 Furthermore, Feeney II states that
“[t]he [Sentencing] Commission shall, upon request, make available to the House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary, the written reports and all underlying records accompanying those
reports described in this section . . . .”62 Zlotnick notes that “one cannot really argue that
Congress should be forbidden from collecting this information,”63 but this overlooks (as well as
proves) the point. It is precisely because sentencing data are matters of public record that Feeney
II’s onerous reporting requirements64 could not represent anything other than a threat to

61

PROTECT Act § 401(h), 117 Stat. at 672.

62

Id.

63

Zlotnick, supra note 54, at 233.

64

So paperwork intensive is the reporting requirement that in order to comply with it, Judge Donald Molloy of the
District of Montana issued a “standing order” directing the U.S. Attorney, within twenty days of any particular
sentencing, to assemble and file with the court clerk a report of the sentence. United States v. Ray, --- F.3d ---, 2004
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sentencing judges – essentially, expressing the sentiment, “we’re watching you,” and nothing
else.65 What is the point of this type of surveillance? “A tool for intimidation” is one oft-voiced
answer,66 and it may be that Congress intended the reporting requirement as a bullying device for
its own sake; by compiling sentencing statistics, Congress may be intimidating judges into
departing downward less frequently merely to keep Congress happy. But intimidation is
generally simply a means to a desired end, and a deeper purpose may therefore exist. Congress
has the power to impeach the judge if he does not satisfy, cumbersome as that process may be.
In fact, Congress’ only constitutional tool of control over the employment of individual, lifetenured federal judges is the broadsword of impeachment;67 it is not far-fetched to claim that one
of the most plausible purposes for the reporting requirement, therefore, is to threaten a judge

WL 1636928, at *1 (9th Cir. Jul 23, 2004). The Ninth Circuit upheld the standing order as constitutional, and not a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at *12-13.
65

In response to the “judicial blacklist” argument, Judge Paul Cassell of the District of Utah has called the criticism
of the Feeney Amendment’s reporting requirement “hyperbolic”: “[T]he overriding fact remains that judicial
departure decisions (like any other judicial action) are already matters of public record. This court’s sentencing
decisions, for example, are all easily available both in the court’s public files and on an internet website,
www.utd.uscourts.gov.” United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 2003); see also United
States v. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Haw. 2004) (parroting VanLeer). That sentencing decisions are
public records and widely available, however, is not logically connected to the conclusion that Congress’ intent in
imposing the reporting requirement was benign; in fact, just the opposite conclusion is far more compelling.
66

Zlotnick, supra note 54, at 233.

67

Though it is not a settled question, it is commonly accepted that an individual judge cannot be removed from
office except by impeachment. See Sen. Jeff Sessions & Andrew Sigler, Judicial Independence: Did the Clinton
Impeachment Trial Erode the Principle?, 29 CUMB L. REV. 489, 506 (1999). I focus on individual judges because
Congress has other tools, such as the power to strip jurisdiction, over the judiciary as a whole. But Congress cannot,
for example, compel a judge to impose a specific sentence on a particular criminal defendant, notwithstanding its
injunctions that judges adhere to the Guidelines. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding
that Congress cannot constitutionally direct particular results in given cases).
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with removal from the bench unless he imposes sentences that pass congressional muster (and
generally, that means sufficiently harsh sentences).68
Feeney II also bars district courts whose downward departures have been reversed (under
the new de novo standard) on appeal from providing another reason to depart on remand.69
This rule is a clear indication that Congress is not really serious about an accurate application of
its own Guidelines.70 Judges are given a single chance to depart downward. The logic seems to
be that it is categorically suspicious that a judge would elect to use that chance at all; but it
would be intolerable to permit that judge a second opportunity, even if circumstances are such
that a correct application of the Guidelines would permit or require it. Again, the “no seconds”
rule requires an assessment of congressional motivation. Since it does not correlate to a more
accurate system of sentencing,71 the reasons for it must be discerned elsewhere. One plausible
explanation for the rule is that it forms a natural extension of the reporting requirement. Under
this theory, the rule can be explained by positing that its supporters believe that judges who
depart downward in a given case and who are reversed are more likely to do so in the same case
68

Cf. the comments of Representative Feeney in a recent interview with the Legal Times: “Scrutinizing judges is a
valid role for members of Congress, [Feeney] said, especially since the Constitution provides only for impeachment
as a method of punishment. ‘When your only option is the nuclear option, you’re very limited.’” Tony Mauro,
Rehnquist’s Olive Branch Too Late?, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 2004.
69

PROTECT Act § 401(e), 117 Stat. at 671.

70

This point is made by Professor Miller, who has commented on Congress’ deep dissatisfaction with and “true
anger” at the Guidelines, in addition to its belief that the Guidelines are overly moderate. See Miller, supra note 51,
at 1248.

71

That the “no seconds” rule is irrational from the perspective of sentencing accuracy is easily demonstrable. A
judge who departs downward for reason A, and who is reversed, may realize on remand that reasons B, C, or D are
also legitimate grounds upon which to depart. Or, reasons B, C, and D may have become legitimate reasons upon
which to depart at some point after the first sentencing and before the resentencing. If reasons B, C, or D are
improper grounds for departure at the resentencing, the appellate court will reverse using their heightened de novo
standard of review. But a judge who is incapable of testing the propriety of reasons B, C, or D runs the (avoidable
and unnecessary) risk of erroneously applying the Guidelines.
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on remand than judges who did not depart in the first instance. There is no reason to continue
collecting sentencing data when a judge has already indicated his inclination to depart once in a
case; all that remains is to stop him from departing. There are ways to render the “no seconds”
rule all but meaningless in practice, but they are not necessarily conducive to a better sentencing
system. For example, a district court that is inclined to depart downward now has incentive to do
so on a large number of grounds, some of which may apply and some of which may not, simply
to cover all possible avenues that may be foreclosed after remand. 72 Perversely, if adopted this
practice will artificially pad a judge’s departure statistics; the “no seconds” rule will increase the
quantity of data contained in the individual reports to Congress, but may not reflect the judge’s
true inclinations toward departures.
The reaction of federal judges to the Feeney Amendment has, unsurprisingly, been
overwhelmingly negative.73 Chief Justice Rehnquist himself called it “an unwarranted and ill-
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See Tracy Friddle, John M. Sands, “Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right”: Remands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines
& The Protect Act – A Radical “Departure”?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 541 (2004).
73

See, e.g., Miller, supra note 51, at 1248-50 (citing angry reactions to the Feeney Amendment in decisions by
Judge Robert P. Patterson in United States v. Kim, 2003 WL 22391190, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2003), and Judge
Paul A. Magnuson in United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2003) (“This reporting
requirement system accomplishes its goal: the Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to depart.”)); In re
Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (in response to the Feeney Amendment, Judge Jack B. Weinstein
required that all sentencings be videotaped for appellate review because he felt that the reviewing court should see
and hear the defendant); United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2004) (Judge Dickran Tevrizian held the reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it allows “individual
judges to be singled-out, threatened, intimidated, and targeted.”); United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022
(D.N.D. 2003) (urging federal judges to speak out against the Feeney Amendment); Brief for Appellant, at 5-6,
United States v. Thompson, No. 03-3632, 2003 WL 23010704 (8th Cir. 2003) (basis of appeal is the statement of
Judge David S. Doty of the District of Minnesota, who refused to depart downward in a case because “judges read
newspapers and watch news broadcasts on television . . . and I think the Court’s under some pressure now because
frankly I follow the trials and tribulations of my chief judge. Consequently, I am frankly not going to [depart
downward].”) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Khan, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2004 WL 1616460, at *16 (E.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2004) (“The Feeney Amendment, among other unsound innovations, prohibits a downward departure unless
the ground for departure was relied upon in the previous sentencing and approved by the court of appeals.”).
Professor Zlotnick has recently published an article based in part on his interviews with a number of district judges,
many of whom expressed their dissatisfaction with the Feeney Amendment and the federal sentencing system. See
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considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial duties,”74
and even adverted indirectly, in the context of the reporting requirement, to Congress’ looming
impeachment power.75 Chief Judge William Young (D. Mass.) suggested (only partly
sarcastically) that the “no seconds” rule was in all likelihood overtly intended to correct the
waywardness of his own past sentencing practices.76 He also took great pains to make perfectly
clear that the Feeney Amendment does not intimidate him77 (in contrast to Judge Magnuson (D.
Minn.), who admits his intimidation)78 and that he continues to have confidence in “the

David M. Zlotnick, Shouting Into the Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER
WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 745 (2004).
74

2003 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, available at www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2003year-endreport.html; see also Gina Holland, Justice Raps Sentencing Rules, Associated Press, March 18,
2004, available at www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/03/18/justice_raps_sentencing_rules/ (in reaction to
the Feeney Amendment, Justice Kennedy stated: “The mandatory minimums enacted by Congress are in my view
unfair, unjust, unwise.”).
75

See supra note 74 (Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: “For side-by-side with the broad authority of Congress to
legislate and gather information in this area is the principle that federal judges are not to be removed from office for
their judicial acts.”).
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United States v. Green, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2004 WL 1381101, at *12 & n.120 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (calling
the Feeney Amendment “the saddest and most counterproductive episode in the evolution of federal sentencing
doctrine” and observing that the “no seconds rule” was driven by Congress’ “apparent[] disgust[] with the conduct
of this Court” as set forth in United States v. Bogdan, 302 F.3d 12, 14-15, 17 (1st Cir. 2002), where Judge Young’s
decision to depart downward for a second time on remand was reversed by the First Circuit).
77

For another example of judicial bravado on the issue of the reporting requirement, see Tom Perrotta, Panel
Laments Lack of Judicial Discretion, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 2003, at 1, who reports the comments of Judges Roger J.
Miner and Chester J. Straub of the Second Circuit in the panel hearing on United States v. Santiago, 76 Fed. Appx.
397 (2d Cir. 2003). When the issue of the defendant’s request for a downward departure arose, Judge Miner is
reported to have stated to the prosecutor: “If we go along with your adversary, you’ll probably take our names and
report them to the attorney general.” As the prosecutor responded, Judge Straub interjected: “Be sure you spell them
correctly. Especially Straub S-T-R-A-U-B.”
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See Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-07. Judge Young reports that Representative Feeney “fired back” a response
to Judge Magnuson, recommending that he “get out the Constitution, where it’s very clear that other than the United
States Supreme Court, all of the other federal courts are only established by the will of the United States Congress.”
Green, 2004 WL 1381101, at n.157 (citing Elizabeth Stawickie, Minnesota Public Radio, Judge Speaks Out Against
Congress, Ashcroft, Oct. 22, 2003, at
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/10/22_stawickie_sentencing/).
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constitutional protections designed to insure an independent judiciary.”79 Interesting, too, are the
cases of two judges who resigned in protest against the Feeney Amendment and the policies it
represents. Judge John S. Martin (S.D.N.Y.), who had vociferously expressed his opposition to
the federal sentencing system before the Feeney Amendment, stepped down in direct response to
the Feeney Amendment.80 Judge Robert J. Cindrich (W.D. Pa.) resigned in at least indirect
response to the new sentencing policies, calling them “morally wrong.”81 While it is surely an
exaggeration to claim that the Feeney Amendment was the sole cause of these judges’
resignations, it is certainly likely (given their uniformly critical comments about federal
sentencing) that the prospect of enforcing a sentencing system with which they disagreed, and
the ominous specter of losing their jobs if they did not, motivated these judges’ resignations so
soon after the passage of the Feeney Amendment.82 In this sense, the distinction between
resignation and removal may not be especially meaningful. Professor Van Tassel notes that
“investigations, threats of investigations, and threats of impeachment can be very powerful tools
in inducing judges to resign from office voluntarily.”83 If the reporting requirement or the other
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Green, 2004 WL 1381101, at *15.
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John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31 (“For a judge to be deprived of
the ability to consider all the factors that go into formulating a just sentence is completely at odds with the
sentencing philosophy that has been a hallmark of the American justice system.”).
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Associated Press, Federal Judge Rips Sentencing Guidelines as He Steps Down, Feb. 2, 2004, at WL 2/2/04
APWIRES 07:23:34.
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In the same vein, some judges responded to the Feeney Amendment and its “draconian” policies by taking senior
status and declining to hear criminal cases. Zlotnick, supra note 73, at 650 & n.15 (citing Richard T. Boylan, Do the
Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 231 (2004)
(providing statistical support that judges took senior status at a higher rate after the Guidelines became effective)).
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Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service – And Disservice –
1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1993).
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rules imposed by the Feeney Amendment84 create an atmosphere wherein some federal judges
feel compelled to resign voluntarily, that atmosphere is no less threatening because other judges
choose to criticize the Feeney Amendment, or simply to endure it without comment. 85
One might imagine that the sentencing context, because it is so inherently inflammatory
and controversial (as well as so readily politicizable), would be especially conducive to
increasing conflict between the judiciary and the legislature, and consequently, as this article
argues, to more frequent threats of judicial removal. The sentencing sphere, however, is not
unique. I contend in the following section that Congress has already found other pockets of
judicial power and discretion that it covets, and that we should expect more frequent threats of
removal deriving from Congress’ usurpative urges.
B.

House of Representatives Resolution 568

One year after his success in reshaping the Sentencing Guidelines, Representative
Feeney, along with Representative Bob Goodatte (VA), introduced a bill on March 17, 2004
expressing
the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based in whole or in part on
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign
judgments, laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of laws

84

Though the JUDGES Act, which is presently circulating in Congress, would repeal certain provisions of the
Feeney Amendment, it is important to note that the reporting requirement would remain effective under JUDGES.
See Patrice Stappert, A Death Sentence for Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Federal Sentencing, 49 VILL.
L. REV. 693, 721 (2004).
85

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) held that the judicial facfinding
procedures called for in the enhancement provisions of Washington State’s determinate sentencing system violated
the Sixth Amendment. Whether and how Blakely will affect the constitutionality of the Guidelines remains to be
seen. Of course, a finding by the Supreme Court (or other lower federal courts, as has already occurred) that the
enhancement provisions of the Guidelines are unconstitutional surely will do nothing to improve the tension
between the two branches; neither, in all likelihood, will Congress’ reaction.
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passed by the elected legislative branches of the United States or otherwise inform an
understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.86
The exception for foreign legal pronouncements that inform the “original meaning of the laws of
the United States” likely found its way into Resolution 568 – also called the “Reaffirmation of
American Independence Resolution”87 – because it was perceived that barring citations to
Blackstone,88 Edmund Burke, or the King’s Bench was not exactly what the House had in
mind.89 Rather, the House was obviously disturbed by what it viewed as a rash of Supreme
Court decisions in which the Justices relied on the statements and opinions of (modern-day)
European judicial and legal authorities.90 The Hearing Statement on Resolution 568 of
Representative Steve Chabot lists disapprovingly Lawrence v. Texas, wherein Justice Kennedy in
his majority decision relied on a decision of the European Court of Human Rights;91 Atkins v.
Virginia, in which Justice Stevens in his majority opinion cited to an amicus brief filed by the
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H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (hereafter “Resolution 568”).
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Jeffrey McDermott, Citation to Foreign Precedent: Congress vs. The Courts, 51-JUL FED. LAW. 20 (2004).
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See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n., 123 S. Ct. 470, 154 L. Ed. 2d 359 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari) (citing Blackstone approvingly but criticizing the views of the Supreme Court of Canada as,
since “foreign,” presumptively suspect): “[T]his court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”
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Moreover, the wholesale disapproval of all foreign pronouncements would have been highly impractical, as it
would have impugned the scores of Supreme Court decisions relying on such precedents.
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See Hearing Statement of Representative Chabot, Committee on the Judiciary, March 25, 2004, available at
www.house.gov/judiciary/chabot032504.htm.
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539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481-83 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)).
The European Court of Human Rights is “[a]uthoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe
(21 nations then, 45 nations now).” Id. Dudgeon did not follow Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) on the
issue of the right of homosexuals to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. As noted by Representative Chabot, in
his dissent Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s citation to “foreign views” as “meaningless” and “[d]angerous
dicta . . . .”
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European Union;92 and Grutter v. Bollinger, in which Justice Ginsburg cited in her concurrence
to an international treaty – the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination.93 Congressman Chabot states his belief (and, presumably, that of the
sponsors and proponents of Resolution 568) that “Americans are subject to the decisions of a
United States Supreme Court that are based, at least in part, on selectively cited decisions drawn
from a variety of foreign bodies.”94
Resolution 568 is an attempt to limit and disavow the presence of exogenous legal
influences in judicial decisions, and as such it is a rather petty and xenophobic concept;
statements of law and policy that come from other nations, of course, never bind U.S. courts;
when they are included in American decisions (which is not often), they are used merely for their
persuasive value – to note that an argument originates with a particular foreign source, to support
an argument with a certain line of foreign reasoning, or to show how an American view
compares with other world views. In any case, there is no logic to the contention that an
argument loses its persuasive force because it originated outside of our national geographic
bounds.
But beyond the knee-jerk provincialism that Resolution 568 represents, it is also a
manifestation of Congress’ will to power in another area traditionally reserved to the judge – the
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536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved. Brief for European Union as
Amicus Curiae 4.”). Justice Stevens also cites to numerous research studies in support of his conclusions, but he
does not specify whether these contain foreign data. Nor is there any indication from the House whether it would
find non-U.S. academic studies suspect.
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539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). It is worth noting that the United States ratified the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994.
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See Statement of Representative Chabot, supra note 90.
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sources cited in and supporting judicial decisions. The putative bill would expressly permit
reliance on foreign sources if they had been “incorporated . . . into the legislative history of laws
passed by the elected legislative branches . . . .” This exception gives rise to several inferences.
First, it indicates that the bill’s supporters are not so much disturbed by the inclusion of foreign
precedent per se as they are about the citation to foreign precedent with which they either are
unfamiliar or disagree. Second, the solution proposed by Resolution 568 is not the wholesale
disapproval of foreign precedent; rather, it is a reservation to Congress of the power to handpick
which foreign precedent is appropriate for consideration and inclusion in judicial decisions. The
reappearance of Representative Feeney as an advocate both of further restrictions on the powers
of the judiciary (this time far outside the sentencing realm) and, as explained below, of the use of
threats of impeachment in response to anticipated judicial noncompliance suggests that the
House (or at least some of its members) is motivated by something other than a real interest in
the subject matter of its lawmaking. What it wants is greater control over the judiciary,
irrespective of the substantive context.
It is true that Resolution 568 is still in its larval stage – there is no indication yet about its
prospects for maturation in the House or Senate, let alone of its appeal to the President.
Moreover, even if passed, it merely would express Congress’ “sense” of disapprobation for the
practice of reliance on non-sanctioned foreign sources; there is nothing in the bill as presently
constituted that speaks of consequences for disobedience. Nevertheless, incredibly, it has
already been suggested by Representative Feeney that judicial disregard for Resolution 568’s
“sense” could be cause for removal from the bench.95 This is archetypal of the use of the threat
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See Mauro, supra note 68, quoting Congressman Feeney: “In discussing the resolution, Feeney suggested that
invoking foreign precedents – increasingly popular from the Supreme Court on down in recent years – could be an
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of impeachment as an instrument of political coercion: few may agree (Representative Feeney, of
course, excepted) that the decision to cite to a foreign decision or legal statement is grounds for
removal. It is certainly not a high crime or misdemeanor. But is it “bad” behavior? Citation to
foreign precedent would certainly (assuming Resolution 568 becomes law, and, to a lesser
degree, even if it does not) be controversial, since it would openly defy the legislative will.
Moreover, while a judge who cited to a foreign precedent in the face of Resolution 568 might not
expect impeachment to follow hot on the heels of his decision’s publication, he might do so with
trepidation because he would know that Congress would “disapprove” of him and would be on
the lookout for other, similar peccadilloes. And, perhaps in such a scenario, multiple and
repeated citations to foreign precedents would, over time, raise sufficiently important eyebrows
to result in formal inquiries.96 Such recurring acts of defiance might not be “good behavior”;
following the model of Judge Baer, threats of impeachment would be the likely congressional
response.97

impeachable offense. Sensenbrenner, in his Judicial Conference speech, cited Feeney’s resolution favorably.”;
McDermott, supra note 87: “The resolution’s sponsor even raised the possibility of impeaching judges who continue
to cite foreign precedent.”
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Or, the judge’s decision to flout the legislative will might prove costly when opportunities for elevation arise. See
Hon. Guido Calabresi, The Current, Subtle – and Not so Subtle – Rejection of an Independent Judiciary, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 637, 643-44 (2002): “The real danger . . . is that if judges think about promotion, they are going to start
being very careful not to make waves. If you are a district judge and you want to get on the court of appeals, it does
not help to have senators of the right or the left criticizing your opinions . . . .”
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Congressman Feeney is an especially illuminating case study because he obviously favors threatened removals as
a useful mechanism of judicial control. See Hearing on the FY 2004 Department of Justice Budget Request, (Apr. 8,
2003), 2003 WL 1849408 (F.D.C.H.). In response to a situation in which Judge Royce C. Lamberth (D.D.C.) was
considering contempt sanctions against Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stuart Schiffer, Congressman Feeney,
though openly admitting that he knew nothing of the case, commented:
[U]ltimately, in separation of powers issues, you’re [the Executive branch] probably not in the court of last
resort in terms of Article I powers . . . . But I . . . like Article I, especially now that I’m in Congress, and it
seems to me that, at a minimum, Congress has the right to set the jurisdiction of federal judges harassing
several dozen members of the Justice Department. It seems to be something that we could effect with our
jurisdictional powers . . . . And then, ultimately, of course, there’s the question of judge’s good behavior.
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Several members of the House Judiciary Committee have expressed views that reinforce
the argument that control over the judiciary, rather than mere disdain for foreign legal
pronouncements, is the true force driving Resolution 568. For example, Representative Feeney
stated:
One of the problems we have with importing foreign law that’s never been ratified by any
of the political branches, the elected branches, is that judges have enormous discretion . .
. . And how is a judge . . . to discern which of the countries[’ decisions] is appropriate to
cite and which . . . is not. . . . . They [the courts] are not competent to do so.98
This refrain was repeated by Representative Steve King (IA) who made it clear that Resolution
568 is only the first step in what he feels should be a grand and far-reaching program of stripping
away judicial power:
The Constitution gives the Congress the authority and the responsibility to establish . . .
the separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial branch of government . .
. .[W]e have this activist court that’s taken over so much authority from the legislative
branch . . . . So we’ve got a lot of work to do here, and I don’t know that we have to do it
in a radical fashion. I think we need to do it in a step-by-step fashion, this being step one,
to send this resolution to limit the courts to the directions that Mr. Feeney has described .
. . and I think we need to follow along with that and do a number of other things to
brighten this line of the separation of powers.99
This separation of powers argument is not quite ingenuous. Congress has never been charged
(constitutionally or otherwise) with selecting which legal precedents the courts may use to
interpret the law or to support the reasoning of their decisions.100 But by claiming that it is the
judiciary that is usurping a historically legislative power, Representative King was able to invoke
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Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th Cong. 112 (Mar. 25, 2004), 2004 WL
598895 (F.D.C.H.).

99

Id.

100

See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule.”).
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the sacred cow of separation of powers to support a general program whose first step is
Resolution 568 – allegedly to “brighten this line [of the separation of powers].” Ironically,
Resolution 568 itself represents a blurring of the separation of powers because it is a move by
Congress to absorb a traditionally judicial function. More importantly, however, in
Representative King’s view, is that the Resolution may be the first sown seed in what will flower
into a comprehensive system of control over the judiciary.
Representative Goodlatte’s comments specifically concern the enforcement of Resolution
568 (i.e., what happens to judges who disregard Congress’ “sense”), but also reflect a wider
interest in increasing the penalties and consequences for judges who resist the new tide of
changes that resolutions such as 568 represent:
And one of the issues that is underlying this resolution, and, I suspect, future clashes . . .
between Congress and the judiciary, is the question of whether the founding fathers . .
really placed in our Constitution enough checks and balances on this [judicial] power or
whether it’s simply a failure of the Congress and the executive branch to act in response
to the acquisition of power that has taken place on the part of our judiciary . . . .
So I would question . . . what measures the Congress could take to effectively exercise
that system of checks and balances that is so clearly contemplated in our Constitution
against abuse of power.
Clearly, we’ve never removed anybody from office for misinterpreting, in our view, a
section of the Constitution, and, clearly, we have never taken the steps that have been
discussed by others, and perhaps we could, but they are very difficult steps. Are there
other things that we should be looking at to check unbridled power on the part of the
courts?101
One of the “other things” that is already being done is to threaten judges with removal. The
possibility inheres in Representative Goodlatte’s musing that “perhaps we could” use removal as
an instrument of punishment, despite the “difficult[y]” of the endeavor to effect an actual
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Supra note 98.
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impeachment. Indeed, Representative Adam Schiff (CA) compared Resolution 568 to the
reporting requirement of the Feeney Amendment, observing that both (“in combination”)102
might “have a chilling effect on the independence of the judiciary.”103 One may well ask why
Congress should bother to pass a law that expresses its position on the question of citation to
foreign law if judges are free to reject that position without fear of adverse consequences. In her
testimony before Congress on Resolution 568, Professor Vicki Jackson referred directly to the
threat of removal as an undeniable presence hovering over the resolution:
What concerns me, Mr. Chairman, about a collective resolution from the House of
Representatives is the fact that the Congress, of course, controls, to some extent, the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Congress is also the body empowered to impeach
and remove from offices the justices.
And my concern is that a resolution of this nature begins to trench on the courts with
respect to the interpretative process, and, if there is anything that I would think was a core
judicial function for the courts, it is how to interpret. And so it is those factors that lead
me to be very concerned about the proposed resolution . . . .
I want to raise a grave caution about the idea that the impeachment power ever would be
used because of disagreement with a decision.104
Representative Nadler (NY), commenting on Representative Feeney’s statements about the
“ultimate remedy” for judicial noncompliance with Resolution 568, was more direct: “In other
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Id.
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Id. The comparison was made in the form of a question to Professor Jeremy Rabkin, who did not answer it.
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Id.; see also statement of Representative Schiff that “[w]e are shooting across the bow [of the judiciary] when we
threaten to subpoena the records of Judge Rosenbaum who comes before the panel and expresses what’s an
unpopular opinion with the panel. We shoot across the bow when we use the word ‘impeachment’ in reference to
the citing of foreign opinion . . . . [T]hat we have decided to showcase this issue, attack this, I think, is part of a
broader and more disturbing trend that is probably more significant than these isolated references to foreign
opinion.”

30

words, we’re threatening impeachment if we disagree with the court. That is the definition of
intimidation.”105
I do not wish to confuse (too much) the issue of the propriety of citation to foreign legal
sources with my principal point – that Congress’ interest in limiting such citations is actually
driven by a larger, overarching desire to strip away traditionally judicial functions and to gain
greater control over the judiciary, and that it will threaten judges with removal to meet those
ends. Certainly, there are legitimate arguments to be made for and against the use of foreign
legal opinion in American caselaw. For example, Professor Harold Koh has suggested that
“transnationalist jurisprudence,” whose champions on the current Court he believes are Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, is a “venerable” judicial approach practiced since the birth of the republic
and which “assumes America’s political and economic interdependence with other nations
operating within the international legal system.”106 Likewise, Professor Bodansky observes that
the knowledge of and respect for international law is a long-standing American tradition, and
that the Supreme Court historically has often looked to international law in construing the
powers of the federal government.107 “In contrast to today,” he writes, “I am not aware that
when the Court, in these earlier cases, paid a decent respect to the opinions of mankind, this was
criticized as illegitimate or otherwise un-American.”108 Others have disagreed, arguing that
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Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 9
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Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect to International Tribunal Rulings, 96 ASIL Proc. 45, 53 (2002). Professor
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“[i]ncluding a new source [international law] fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium of
constitutional decision making,”109 or that the selective use of international materials “serves as
mere cover for the expansion of selected rights favored by domestic advocacy groups, for
reasons having nothing to do with anything international.”110 Judge Posner has recently
presented four grounds for his conclusion that citation to foreign sources as persuasive argument
should be avoided.111 At least some of these reasons are, in my view, problematic,112 but all of
these arguments, pro- and con-, do not speak directly to a congressionally imposed categorical
rule disallowing, with sanctioned exceptions, the inclusion of foreign sources in American
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Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM.
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See e.g., Judge Posner’s “first problem” – that “according precedential weight to foreign or international
decisions” offers “promiscuous opportunities” for citation. Id. at 41. Judge Posner brings to bear the generally
accepted rule against citing to unpublished decisions, believing it to be sound “because those opinions receive less
careful attention from the judges than the ones they publish.” But there is no necessary parallel with foreign
decisions here. A rule categorically forbidding citation to foreign decisions does not discriminate between, on the
one hand, decisions pored over by foreign judges and intended by them as precedent-setting and, on the other, the
foreign equivalent of the unpublished decision. Of course, judges wishing to cite, for example, to Italian precedent
should be familiar with the difference in precedential value between the decisions of, say, la Corte di cassazione, la
Pretura, and la Corte d’assize. Once a certain background knowledge is established, however, foreign precedent
could add desirable nuance to the analysis of many issues in American law. See Vicki Jackson, Argument: Could I
Interest You in Some Foreign Law? Yes Please, I’d Love To Talk With You, 2004-AUG LEGAL AFF. 43
(“Understanding references to foreign law in their legal and historic context should defuse unwanted criticisms,
highlight the benefits of well-informed uses of foreign and international legal sources, and focus attention on some
genuinely difficult questions.”).
Judge Posner’s second problem – that in order to cite foreign decisions credibly, American judges would
have to possess a profound knowledge about the socio-political history of the country in question, as well as that
country’s historical approach to the issue in question – suffers from the same type of flaw as his first problem.
There is no reason to suppose that American judges, at all levels, have the sort of broad cultivation with respect to
American socio-political history that Posner would require. Nevertheless, when confronted with particular issues to
decide, judges often educate themselves about the background of their particular legal question. Why should they
not seek as broad-based an education as possible?
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judicial decisions. The selected statements of the House members provide a better understanding
of the motivations undergirding Resolution 568 than do the academic musings about the
desirability of using foreign sources. And those legislative expressions demonstrate that
Resolution 568 is widely intended merely as one small stage in what many Congressmen hope
will be a far-ranging program of absorbing judicial power.
I have examined two legislative programs (the Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568)
that strip federal judges of powers they traditionally held and I have argued that their sponsors
and proponents are prepared to threaten judges with removal for noncompliance. But there are
several other examples of “jurisdiction stripping” bills that have been enacted and will be
introduced in the coming terms. With the defeat in the Senate of the constitutional amendment
banning gay marriage, Representative John Hostettler (IN) introduced legislation that would bar
federal courts from hearing lawsuits, even lawsuits raising constitutional issues, related to
homosexual sex and marriage.113 This bill passed in the House on July 22, 2004,114 and House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay (TX) has “told reporters . . . that he plans to use ‘jurisdiction
stripping’ measures to achieve other policy goals as well,” including proposed legislation to
prevent federal courts from hearing lawsuits related to the words “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance and, though he believes the time is “not quite ripe,” eventually to the issue of
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abortion.115 Obviously, the constitutionality of such measures is an unknown quantity.116
Nevertheless, these bills and others of similar stirp very much represent the type of pervasive
program envisioned by Representatives Feeney, King, Goodlatte, Chabot, DeLay and many
others.117 In the face of this “jurisdiction stripping” legislation, judges will have three options:
acceptance, criticism, or resignation. If the Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568 are any
guide, judges who choose the second approach should expect Congress to threaten them with
removal for their opposition.118
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See Editorial: Muzzling the Courts?, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 2004, at A18: “[F]oes of same-sex marriage
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Congress may very well be vested with the power to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over many of
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III.

Two (Interrelated) Explanations for the Phenomenon
What can explain the present pervasiveness of congressional threats of removal against

judges? The question is complex and its answers are likely numerous – too many, in fact, for the
space and scope of this article. Part of the explanation lies in the indeterminacy of possible
conduct encompassed by the “good behavior” clause, which has been directly invoked by
Congressman Feeney as the standard by which judicial removals should be assessed.119 Political
ideology, of course, jumps out immediately as a plausible motivation, and, in the case of the
legislation I have examined, it is conservative political ideology (harsher penalties for criminals
and a reflexive distrust of foreign legal thought) that seems to predominate. In fact, some have
argued that conservatives have seethed at least since the Warren Court era – i.e., “from the
Miranda ruling to the recent decision overturning the Texas sodomy statute” 120 – about the
purported liberalism of the judiciary. It is no accident, after all, that the vast majority of
Congressmen sponsoring and supporting the Feeney Amendment, Resolution 568, and the
various jurisdiction stripping measures are staunch conservatives, as are those who seem most
Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 8 (1997), Statement of Representative Bob Barr (GA):
“It is time to start exploring how and in what way we might take steps to ‘rebalance’ and restore integrity to our
Federal justice system. This includes, but is not limited to, exploring the manner in which the constitutional tenure
for judges to hold their office during ‘good behavior’ can be fully effectuated to take into account the consequences
for misbehavior – a problem plainly presented to the American people by the assumption of power beyond the scope
of the office. There are . . . a number of ways that the problems of judicial activism or overreaching[] can be
addressed: defining “good behavior;” limiting tenure of judges; limitations on the jurisdiction of judges and
impeachment.”
Jurisdiction stripping bills were certainly not unheard of in earlier decades but very few of them were
enacted. See Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary, 46 VILL. L. REV.
745, 770 (2001): “It has been reported that, between 1953 and 1968, more than sixty pieces of legislation were
introduced in Congress to restrict federal court jurisdiction over particular matters . . . [but] these efforts were
unsuccessful . . . .” Jurisdiction stripping, therefore, as an effective congressional mechanism of judicial control, is
of relatively recent vintage.
119
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inclined to threaten removal for disregard of their ideological viewpoints. There is surely some
truth to the contention that conservative ideology is one of the forces driving the current
congressional hostility toward the judiciary.
But conservative ideology alone is an insufficient explanation. Congressional Democrats
have been extraordinarily active in preventing President Bush’s judicial nominees from
ascending the bench, and that, too, is a kind of antagonism toward the judiciary.121 The vitriolic
tenor of these appointment battles is no less high pitched than in the contexts I have discussed,
and, irrespective of one’s political feelings, liberal ideology is the constitutional impediment, as
it has been at many other times in the past.122 To this argument it may properly be responded
that it is not conservative or liberal ideology, but ideology generally, that is to blame for the poor
state of relations between the judicial and legislative branches. This position requires us to ask
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Restraint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 637-39 (2002): “In the coming years, we
can expect characterizing judicial ideology in the traditional terms of ‘conservative,’ ‘liberal,’ ‘activist,’ or
adherence to ‘judicial restraint,’ to be of only limited utility. The first reason is ideological drift. In the world of
constitutional law there are few fixtures . . . . Second, the fragmentation of liberalism has produced confusion and
uncertainty about what exactly a contemporary ‘liberal’ judge would favor . . . . Moreover, . . . we can expect further
fragmentation of conservatives. Splits likely will arise not only in how conservatives prioritize sources of
constitutional authority, but also exacerbate divisions among libertarians, social conservatives, moral skeptics, and
those who favor property rights and natural law.”
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what is intended by “ideology.” If we accept that one definition of ideology is “the ways in
which meaning establishes and maintains relations of power,”123 then it becomes critical to
examine the way in which the legislature and judiciary share and compete for power to arrive at
an answer to the question. With this definition in mind, I offer what is surely an incomplete list
of two other explanations for the prevalence of congressional threats of removal against the
judiciary – one theoretical and the other social – that, when taken in tandem, may make some
sense of the current state of affairs.
A.

The Threat as Rational in the Contest for Power Among the Legislative and
Judicial Branches

One might reasonably suppose that no judge has ever been impeached, tried, and
removed who was not first threatened with removal. If that claim is accepted, one might ask
why anyone should be troubled by the act of threatening judges with removal; that threat, after
all, is simply the first link in the chain that eventually results (or does not) in the removal of a
judge from the bench. Impeachment and conviction without an antecedent threat to do so may
well be a logical impossibility. But what if the threat to remove a federal judge were, as a rule,
uncoupled with removal itself? In this situation, there would be few impeachments (as there are
now), but frequent public, vocal threats of removal. Is this a probable occurrence?
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Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat, Hidden in Plain View: Murray Edelman in the Law and Society Tradition, 29
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 439, 455 (2004) (citing JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE (1990)).
This definition, I recognize, has a bit of the Marxian about it. See Emery G. Lee, The Federalist in an Age of
Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 On the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmations Process, 30 OHIO N.U.L.
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I would argue that one basis for the use of the threat as an instrument of social and
political control was first developed by Thomas Hobbes.124 Following Professor Robin West, I
set out (“[j]ust to refresh recollection”)125 a passage of Hobbes’ Leviathan to frame my
contention:
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in attaining our Ends. And
therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both
enjoy, they become enemies; and in this way to their End, (which is principally their own
conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy or subdue one
another . . . .
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets
upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours,
as far as he dares . . . to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and
from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First,
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety, and the third, for
Reputation . . . . [T]he third, [makes men violent] for trifles, as a word, a smile, a
different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by
reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.126
It has been argued that the relationship between individuals in competition for power described
by Hobbes has important implications in the context of employment discrimination.127 “To deny
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employment . . . to those that seek it, is to Dishonour,”128 and it is to be expected that many
things which men desire and for which they compete and strive in the working world, either with
fellow employees or with their employers (“trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion”), will
drive men to violence (in the broad sense intended by Hobbes)129 to obtain them. Only the
“imperative law,” backed by threat of retribution for non-compliance,130 can guard against the
natural inclinations of the employer toward preserving and expanding the ken of its control over
the employed. Hobbesian “Honour” does not depend upon morality or whether an action is
abstractly “just or unjust”, but instead “consisteth onely in the opinion of power.”131
The connection I would draw to the relationship between our legislative and judicial
branches is the following. The legislator and the judge perpetually vie for power, in that the
judge applies and/or critiques (by striking down) the law created by the legislator in ways that
the legislator may not have intended, nor perhaps ever conceived, and the legislator reacts by
recreating the law to suit his intention. In this manner, though the two operate on rather different
planes, each branch exerts influence and is in a position of substantive oversight as to the other;
thus, built into the political framework is the concept that neither branch wholly trusts the other

Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 615-17 (1993) (arguing that Title VII would be more effective if it “reflect[ed] a
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to fulfill its obligations and each always suspects that the other will overstep the bounds of its
powers given the right opportunity.132 The conditions are ideal for Hobbes’ mutual
“diffidence.”133 In addition, however, the legislator is vested with the power to remove the judge
– in essence, the legislator retains the employer’s power of job termination in respect of the
judge – while the judge is neither reciprocally authorized to remove the legislator nor, for that
matter, retains any control at all over the legislator’s job tenure.134 It is a short step to conclude
that since he is in competition with the judge, and since he also has the power of impeachment,
the legislator qua employer will use threats of removal (i.e., job termination) against the judge –
thereby “dishonouring” the judge – in order to gain “glory” in the form of additional coveted,
substantive powers formerly possessed by the judge and influence over the judge’s decisions.
The conclusion is fortified by the reality that Congress’ impeachment decisions, unlike all of its
132
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legislative functions, are sui generis in that they are not subject to any kind of review,135 as well
as by the fact that judges have no tools with which to resist. In this sense, it is misleading to
speak of the constitutional framework as comprised of three separate, co-equal branches, because
the legislature’s power of job termination over the judiciary threatens to trump all other divisions
of power between those two branches.
Hobbes’ views of the costs of a divided sovereignty are familiar; he clearly believed that
only the state unified under a single and unchallenged power could avoid the type of ‘interbranch’ conflict inevitable in all other governmental forms.136 It is not necessary, however, to
accept Hobbes’ centralized autocratic solution (and the relative powerlessness he envisions for
his judiciary) in order to agree that his statement of the problem of shared governmental power
has important implications for our constitutional system.137 Isaak Dore suggests that the
constitutional division of power between the executive and judicial branches creates just such
conflict because “[u]nder a Hobbesian view, the most important issue is not whether the question
is answered correctly, but that it be answered decisively.”138 Thus, according to Dore, executive
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review of judicial constitutional interpretation is “a step away from definitiveness in
decisionmaking and hence problematic for social stability.”139 If that is true, there is even more
reason to believe that similar conflicts will arise in the legislative / judicial relationship.
Assuming that Congress is interested in both (1) creating laws that reflect the will of its
constituents (that the “question is answered correctly,” under Dore’s formulation), and (2)
legitimating and expanding the scope of its own law-giving and other powers while
contemporaneously conveying to the public that its decisions are final and unassailable (“that
[the question] be answered decisively”), its use of the impeachment threat against judges is a
perfectly rational choice – one which arguably would conduce to greater social stability in that
ultimately it would centralize judicial power (or some judicial power) in the legislature. 140 It is
no answer, moreover, that “[t]o construe the impeachment power to enable Congress to penalize
or threaten federal judges because of nothing more than disagreement with their substantive
decisions would . . . unnecessarily upset the balance of branch power.”141 That may well be
true. But it raises the possibility that Congress’ second posited aim – an increase in the scope of
its powers with respect to those of the judiciary – might ultimately conflict with and overcome its
first aim – the fulfillment of its legislative responsibility.
“Threat theory” is a term that could be used to characterize the psychological pressures
attending the judicial / legislative relationship described above. Indeed, despite the visceral
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moral reaction generally evoked by the word “threat,” the threat and its purposes are more
rationally understood as merely an “actor’s credible communication of interest, capacity, and
contingent intention . . . designed to forewarn another actor that if it does not desist from or
adjust certain behavior, more destructive instruments will be applied.”142 In the context of
threats of removal from the bench, what makes such threats effective is not the actual prospect of
impeachment, but instead the fear of the possibility (however actually remote) of removal – “the
exploitation of potential force.”143 To a significant degree, therefore, it matters psychologically
much less whether or not the threat of impeachment is carried out than that it was made at all.
As Professor Cross has observed:
If Congress and the courts are playing a game of “chicken” to control doctrine, one does
not need an actual car crash to demonstrate an effect from the threat of impeachment . . .
.The threat of impeachment has significance even beyond face value and beyond the
particular judge threatened with impeachment. A threat may form a part of the complex
interaction of relations between legislature and judiciary. It may simply be a form of
signaling legislative displeasure with doctrinal action and may carry the veiled threat of a
variety of other attacks on the Court . . . . Threatening impeachment is effective in that it
targets a particular judge or decision that has aroused Congress’ wrath and informs the
Court about congressional preferences on a particular issue and their relative salience.144
Given both the power structure between the legislative and judicial branches, and the approach
taken by many in the House of Representatives in pushing forward particular agendas, there is
every reason to suppose that as those programs are met with judicial resistance, judges should
expect threats of removal from the legislature with increasing frequency.

142

W. Michael Reisman, Assessing the Benefits of Nonmilitary Enforcement: The Case of Economic Sanctions, 89
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC 337, 351 (1995).

143

See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 5 (1963).

144

Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW.
U.L. REV. 1437, 1462 (2001).

43

But there is nothing novel in such a theory – Hobbes, after all, wrote well over a century
before the republic’s founding, and judges and legislators have had intercourse and disagreement
ever since. If threat theory can plausibly explain the reasons for legislative use of threats of
removal against judges, it cannot account for an increased prevalence of such threats in today’s
legislative / judicial relationship. Only a theory that identifies something distinctive about the
modern state of affairs will suffice for that purpose.
B.

Culture of Criticism: The Political Consequences of Overabundance

Judge Posner has observed that “[e]xceptionally able judges arouse suspicion of having
an ‘agenda,’ that is, of wanting to be something more than just corks bobbing on the waves of
litigation or umpires calling balls and strikes.”145 His metaphor applies to the exceptionally able
and the ordinary alike, and illustrates the general public diffidence about the capacity of judges
to make decisions that will be respected and recognized as legitimate. That distrust has political
consequences. I would argue that Congress has seized upon an increasing public faithlessness as
to the legitimacy of the grounds upon which judges judge in order to advance its own political
ends. In short, Congress has recognized that public criticism of the judiciary not only has
become more prevalent and popular than ever before, but that it is also unlikely to diminish.
Congress has and will continue to capitalize on this widespread cultural embrace of judicial
criticism as a social virtue in order to increase the scope of its powers over the judiciary – which
is the real aim of legislation such as the Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568.
In a recent article entitled “Culture of Quiescence,” Professor Carl T. Bogus argues that
there is “a strongly enforced taboo within the Rhode Island legal culture against criticizing the
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state’s governmental institutions, particularly its courts.” 146 Though he concentrates specifically
on Rhode Island, his larger theme (and what is of interest here) deals with the necessity of
subjecting the judiciary at large to constant and vociferous criticism. “People who are overly
protected from criticism,” he contends, “come to a bad end,” and no public servant is more likely
to suffer from a lack of regular inoculations of public criticism than the judge.147 Lawyers
dealing with judges “bow and scrape,” law clerks are “awestruck,” and only few brave souls
muster the gumption to “tell a judge she is wrong.”148 The eventual result of such pervasively
fawning treatment, Bogus argues, is the manifestation of “black robe disease,” whose symptoms
– impatience, disdain, cantankerousness – are brought on by the judge’s belief in his own
omniscience.149
Bogus’ basic point is that the judiciary needs more critics and more outspoken,
unabashed criticism – “a healthy debate on the merits” of the individual decisions judges
make.150 Such criticism, which is in vast undersupply in his view, is vitally necessary because
“an institution that cannot tolerate criticism is inherently unhealthy. A lack of criticism leads
inevitably to distorted self-perceptions. An institution that cannot hear criticism will lose
opportunities to correct errors and improve . . . .”151 Similar points about the value of lawyer
criticism of the judiciary have been made by Professor Monroe Freedman, who claims that
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lawyers “are particularly knowledgeable about judges’ conduct, and are therefore in a position to
inform the public about abuses of judicial power.”152 For Bogus, the present state of affairs is a
general systemic malady:
[T]he problem is not limited to the federal district court. This is a problem in the wider
professional culture – a culture that equates disagreement with confrontation, institutional
criticism with ad hominem attack, and anything that even smacks of personal criticism
with contemptuousness. These are self-defeating responses . . . . Federal district judges . .
. are well armored against a critic’s arrows. They have life tenure. They do not need to
worry about the next election; the ebb and flow of popularity need not concern them.
Indeed, popularity cannot, and should not, concern them at all . . . . Hypersensitivity to
criticism is counterproductive. As everyone understands, thin skin is a characteristic of
the insecure.153
There are, of course, numerous generally accepted truths about the value of criticism: that
one should be willing to listen to criticism; that criticism, properly understood and assessed,
stimulates and promotes self-improvement; that those who are unwilling to hear criticism do
themselves a disservice, and so forth. Criticism is also rightly valued from the perspective of the
speaker. The freedom to criticize at will is a hallmark of an open society. We value uninhibited
criticism for what it represents about our capacity to tolerate differing views, even if we
recognize that those views vary greatly in worth. Bogus argues that these bromides about the
unassailable righteousness of criticism apply wholesale to the judiciary, but does little in the way
of explaining why criticism is so very necessary for the improvement of the judiciary as an
institution or for individual judges; he simply accepts the proposition that criticism is of
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unquestionable value, and chastises judges for being overly sensitive to it (and lawyers for not
doing enough of it).
In fact, superabundant criticism is not an unmitigated good; to argue otherwise is not to
take a realistic and complete view of criticism’s power. Alongside the bevy of criticism’s social
virtues should be listed several of its negative qualities and consequences: criticism is
destabilizing; criticism can corrode institutional foundations; criticism can be self-serving, meanspirited, lacking in depth, and motivated by something quite other than the improvement of the
criticized.154 These darker sides to criticism are just as germane as its legitimate benefits to a full
understanding of criticism’s social impact.
The more substantial point, however, is that the destructive power of criticism is of
particular relevance to the judicial institution. Judges are charged to resolve disputes – in effect,
to put an end to the exchange of critical and opposing points of view – and their authority is
premised in large measure on the perceived legitimacy of their decisions. I say “perceived”
because whether or not a particular decision is ultimately correct (i.e., “based on the law,” if that
is capable of definition) or even fair is not necessarily the most vital measure of the judicial
institution’s strength. Rather, the judiciary is most successful in fulfilling its duties when the
public whom it serves believes profoundly in the authority of judges to make decisions that will
affect the public, even if adversely. When that authority is too much tarnished, or disprized, or
criticized, it becomes impossible for judges to perform their function, and, indeed, for a society
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to have judges, because the respect necessary to legitimate decisions ceases to exist. If judges
are sensitive to criticism, it should not automatically be supposed that “black robe disease” is
setting in. That sensitivity is instead at least as readily attributable to the especially problematic
role that criticism of a particular judge plays in the weakening of the judicial institution in the
eyes of the public.
Bogus cites to a tract from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, but the passage he offers does not clearly support his
argument: “The [Supreme] Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what
the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”155 The public perception of the
Supreme Court’s legitimacy is not driven by society’s general understanding or approbation of
the decisions reached by the Court. It does not, therefore, depend on the public’s satisfaction
155
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that the Court’s legal conclusions are sound, or that its holdings are well-reasoned, rhetorically
persuasive, or analytically comprehensive.156 If criticism of this kind is to be offered, it is the
law scholar, practicing specialist or judge that is in a position to do so, because such criticism (if
it is worth listening to) requires not only a reaction to the result reached, but also, and more
importantly, the technical and educational background to assess the reasoning and argument
deployed to reach the result.157
Instead, the public perception of judicial legitimacy, when it exists, stems from a deepseated, historic trust that the Supreme Court (or any other court) is correct because it is the
Court, and therefore the final and most credible voice on the law.158 To return to Hobbes, “[i]t is

judiciary does not necessarily correlate inversely to the amount of criticism leveled against the judiciary.
Conversely, a society that heaps criticism on its judiciary does not thereby demonstrate its greater respect.
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not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a law.”159 Without an intrinsic cultural faith in the
‘rightness’ of the judiciary, borne of the traditional place in the collective consciousness of the
judiciary as the final authority over matters legal, courts cannot maintain their lofty status in the
perception of those whom they serve but who often may not understand what they do.160 And
this remains true irrespective of how receptive courts may be to criticism – even criticism whose
aims are purely altruistic – of the decisions they reach in any given case or circumstance.161
Too easily does Bogus dismiss the damage that criticism can inflict on the judiciary:
“[t]hey have life tenure . . . . Courts can take care of themselves.”162 Life tenure, as we have
seen, is one of the mechanisms that renders rather procedurally complicated the process of
ousting a judge by impeachment and conviction. I would hazard that for most judges, the
security of life tenure is not a narcotic that numbs the sense of responsibility to perform one’s
offices properly, nor is it remotely sufficient, of itself, to guarantee a well-functioning
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judiciary.163 It is true that life tenure is one of the few constitutionally prescribed prophylactics
supporting the judiciary’s independence. But that does not mean that the constitutional
justifications for judicial independence are necessarily circumscribed by arguments to be drawn
exclusively from the “good behavior” clause. Proponents of this type of purely textualist
understanding of judicial independence “posit[] the existence of a constitutional scheme so
incomplete that the capacity of individual judges to decide cases without intimidation, and of the
judicial branch to preserve its institutional integrity, is left to dangle by the thread of legislative
sufferance – a state of affairs that is difficult to reconcile with the framers’ emphatic support for
judicial independence.”164 Moreover, for Bogus to cite life tenure, in isolation, as a reason that
we should not worry or care about the state of the judiciary highlights his inherently combative
perspective: he seems to be advocating some kind of cultural upheaval within the legal
profession and society at large against the judiciary.165 It is difficult to see how this type of
criticism would do much to improve the judicial institution, though it would certainly increase
social fragmentation, hostility, polarization and resentment.
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Whether or not one agrees that criticism of the judiciary is unqualifiedly desirable, it is
something else again to accept the contention that we live in a society and an era where such
criticism is in insufficient supply. In fact, this is not the case at all – criticism of individual
judges and the judiciary generally is in great abundance. There are numerous surveys reporting
on the public’s discontent with judges and the state of the judiciary;166 the national debate rages
like never before on the importance and proper parameters of judicial independence and
accountability, with arguments for and against criticism of the judiciary and individual judges
abounding; 167 bar associations and other attorney organizations have formed commissions in
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commentators have begun to suggest that post-Watergate cynicism is finally catching up with the judiciary.”
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Law school symposia and conferences in the past ten or so years alone on the many and complex facets of
“judicial independence” and “judicial accountability” are too numerous to list in full. See, e.g., the University of
Richmond Allen Chair Symposium 2003: Independence of the Judiciary (2003); Ohio State University’s
Symposium on Perspectives on Judicial Independence, Accountability, and Separation of Powers Issues (2003); the
University of Pennsylvania’s Conference on Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: Developing an
Interdisciplinary Research Agenda (2004); Fordham University’s “Special Series: Judicial Independence”; the
University of Southern California’s Judicial Independence and Accountability Symposium (1998); Georgia State
University’s Symposium on Judicial Review and Judicial Independence: The Appropriate Role of the Judiciary
(1998); Hofstra University’s Symposium on Judicial Independence (1997); the University of Dayton’s Symposium
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response to the tidal wave of public criticism directed at judges and have issued a host of reports
on the state of public confidence in the judiciary;168 the media have taken an unprecedentedly
aggressive role in criticizing judges and their decisions;169 and judges themselves have become
far more outspoken critics of their colleagues than ever before.170

on International Law and Judicial Autonomy (1996); Mercer Law School’s Symposium on Federal Judicial
Independence (1995); the University of Pennsylvania’s “Disciplining the Federal Judiciary” series (1993).
There is even a separately published bibliographical collection of materials (listing scores of books,
articles, reports, etc.) that treat judicial independence and accountability. Many of these deal with the proper role of
criticism of judges and the judiciary. See Amy B. Atchison, et al., Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (1999). Surely scores more have accreted since
1999, as evidenced by the extraordinarily rich quantity of recent scholarship in this area.
168

See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Judicial Div. Lawyers Conference & Special Committee on Judicial Independence,
Response to Criticism of Judges (1998); Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence, Report: An Independent Judiciary – Executive Summary (1997): “A new cycle of intense political
scrutiny and criticism of the judiciary is now upon us . . . . If Congress and the courts do not cooperate in a
constructive and restrained manner, public confidence in the judiciary will be adversely affected . . . . Public support
for the judicial system is perceived to be in a dangerous state of decline.”; Boston Bar Ass’n Judicial Response Task
Force Report (2003): “Over the past several years, judges in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as well as around
the country have come under increased criticism in the media and among members of the public for their decisions
and orders. This denigration of the courts undermines the public’s respect for our judicial system, and is often based
on a misunderstanding of either the judicial process or the facts of a particular case.”; 2 Panels to Review Criticism
of Judges, N.Y.L.J., September 30, 1996, at 2; D. Dudley Oldham & Seth S. Andersen, Commentary: The Role of
the Organized Bar In Promoting an Independent and Accountable Judiciary, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 341-42 (2003):
“The organized bar has a long history of promoting an independent and accountable judiciary. Lawyers and judges
have led efforts to improve judicial selection methods, establish codes of conduct and ethics, and promote public
trust and confidence in the judiciary . . . . Lawyers and judges have also taken the lead at the state and federal levels
in designing and administering rules and programs to promote accountability of judges to the public they serve. Bar
polls, judicial performance evaluation programs, and codes of conduct and ethics for judges are just a few examples
of the means by which lawyers seek to temper the independence of the judiciary with a healthy and appropriate dose
of accountability.”
Bogus himself speaks admiringly of the Philadelphia bar as willing “to speak out collectively and publicly
about perceived problems in the administration of justice, whether by the courts or other instruments of
government.” See Bogus, supra note 146, at 353.
169

See, e.g., MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH (1998)
(Boot, a writer for the Wall Street Journal, offers a plethora of often contemptuous criticism against an assortment of
judges); Mark Kozlowski, THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT THE COURTS
(2004), and Richard E. Morgan, Grasping At Straws, CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS, Summer 2004, at 53 (book
review of THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT THE COURTS): “Readers of
this journal are familiar with the withering criticism, more acute every year, directed at judicial adventurism that has
been, since the Warren Court, a growing pathology in American governance.”; Patrick M. Garry, The First
Amendment in a Time of Media Proliferation: Does Freedom of Speech Entail a Private Right to Censor, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 183, 187 (2004): “With respect to the electronic media, much of the First Amendment case law has
been based on a concern with scarcity . . . . To address this concern for scarcity of voices, the marketplace metaphor
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We are at a considerable distance from Bogus’ lamentable state of an imperious, scornful,
and craven judiciary whose decisions are shielded from criticism at every turn by an obsequious,
servile public. Our condition is much more convincingly described in a recent article by Justice
Margaret Marshall of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.171 In analyzing the effects of
Bridges v. California,172 where the Supreme Court overturned contempt sanctions imposed on a
labor leader and a newspaper that had publicly criticized the judge’s decision in a pending case,
Justice Marshall observed that
American jurisprudence concerning scandalizing the court departed sharply from the path
of English common law. It has never looked back. With what consequences? On the
most tangible level, Bridges and its progeny have allowed the live practice of justice to
unfold before the American people in all of its raw immediacy and sometimes
manipulative theatricality. Press conferences on the courthouse steps, in front of a
mountain of microphones, are now common fare on American newscasts. Our airwaves
crackle with programs that purport to bring gavel-to-gavel trial coverage to the public.
Instant telephone polls and Internet chat rooms augment the telecasts, allowing viewers to
was applied. However, lost in all the obsession with scarcity was the reality of what was taking place within
America’s media. An overload of consumer information and entertainment was drowning out just the kind of
political and public affairs dialogue the First Amendment values most.”
Whether or not one agrees with Professor Garry, the quantity of media coverage, and criticism, of the
judiciary (written and oral decisions, conduct on and off the bench, qualifications for appointment, personal habits,
etc.) is staggering. In addition to the profusion of coverage in the print media, electronic media has exponentially
increased the quantity of reporting and criticism of matters judicial.
170

See generally William G. Ross, Civility Among Judges: Charting the Bounds of Proper Criticism By Judges of
Other Judges, 51 FLA. L. REV. 957, 958-72 (1999). Professor Ross writes that criticism of judges by other judges
has recently increased in four distinct areas: “bilious written opinions”; “public comments about specific judges or
their decisions”; criticism of particular courts; and private comments about fellow judges. In the context of judicial
elections (which occur in 38 of 50 States), the Supreme Court has removed essentially all impediments to free
speech for judicial candidates. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that
a state forfeits its interest in the appearance of an impartial judiciary when it decides to elect its judges;
consequently, they must permit judicial candidates to exercise their full free speech rights under the First
Amendment). Judicial campaign speech and reciprocal criticism of candidates for elected judicial office is in
plentiful abundance. See, e.g., Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico,
One Who Exalted Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615 (2004); Geyh, supra note 156, at 49-50.
171

See Margaret H. Marshall, Dangerous Talk, Dangerous Silence: Free Speech, Judicial Independence, and the
Rule of Law, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 455 (2002).
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314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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vote on, among other things, whether the accused should be found guilty. The coverage
is not only national but international . . . .
But more important than feeding America’s voyeuristic, ‘prurient culture’, Bridges and
the cases that have built on it have laid the American judiciary open to the unrelenting
scrutiny of the public, which, more often than not, means the scrutiny of the media.
Some of this criticism has been polite and restrained; some quite the opposite.173
Though it surely is true that criticism of the judiciary did not suddenly rear its head in the last
twenty years, the advent of technologies that carry critical commentary with increasing speed is a
phenomenon of the later half of the twentieth century. “More information technology offers not
only more speech but more ways to deliver that speech.”174 By virtue of these advances in
communication, there is more criticism of the judiciary simply because there are more people
with access to it, and therefore more people doing and responding to it.175 Thus, criticism of the
judiciary has expanded to a much broader range of listeners and participants than has ever before
been the case; moreover, this expansion is not mirrored by a concomitant increase in public
understanding of the judicial function;176 and the result has been, at one and the same moment, a
general coarsening177 and exponential intensification of, respectively, the quality and quantity of
judicial criticism.
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Marshall, supra note 171, at 458.
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Garry, supra note 169, at 187; see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805,
(1995) (arguing that the “infobahn” made possible by new technologies will “democratize the information
marketplace – make it more accessible for comparatively poor speakers as well as rich ones – and diversify it”).
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Garry, supra note 169, at 194.
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Id. at 208: “Nor has the abundance [of speech and criticism made possible by the media] automatically led to a
more informed and analytical citizenry, nor to a greater diversity of viewpoints.”
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Again, I would emphasize that I do not claim that all criticism of the judiciary is undesirable, and I recognize that
certain criticism is helpful and to be solicited. My point is that the sheer volume of judicial criticism (of all kinds)
for its own sake is of debatable social and institutional value.
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What political consequences, if any, follow from this overabundance of public criticism?
Congress, surely, has not been oblivious to the increased prevalence and perceived desirability of
unfettered judicial criticism. The congressional measures discussed in this article (and surely
many others that aim to curtail judicial powers) purportedly are rooted in the public’s suspicion
toward and resentment against the judiciary.178 In fact, the terrain of public opinion has never
been more fertile for the congressional power-plays exemplified by legislation such as the
Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568. It is the popularity and profusion of judicial criticism,
peaking, as it has, relatively recently, that has enabled Congress to brandish its impeachment
powers against the judiciary with far less restraint than it once could have. Thus, this culture of
criticism renders possible (or at the very least greatly facilitates) Congress’ deployment of threat
theory against judges. More than the advancement of any particular set of beliefs
(“conservative” or “liberal”), it is the combination of widespread, public criticism and the
legislative will to control the judiciary by stripping away and absorbing traditionally judicial
functions that motivates Congress’ threats of removal against judges – itself an acute form of
judicial criticism.
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See Sensenbrenner Remarks Before the U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional Oversight
Responsibility of the Judiciary, 150 Cong. Rec. E425-03 (Mar. 23, 2004) (Congressman Sensenbrenner states that
the Feeney Amendment “represents a legislative response to a long-standing congressional concern that the
Sentencing Guidelines were increasingly being circumvented by some federal judges,” and emphasizes Congress’
oversight responsibilities as the rightful duty of the “elected representatives of the people”); Hearing on H.R. Res.
568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th Cong. 112 (Mar. 25, 2004), 2004 WL 598895 (Congressman
King roots the impetus for Resolution 568 in the public’s disaffection with the judiciary by asking: “If we are going
to go down the path of . . . judicial activism, that sees the future of America in a way that’s not accountable to the
voice of the people, like we have to be – if we go down that path, what does the Constitution mean?”).
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It is at this juncture that one might well ask what can be done to improve matters.179
Justice O’Connor’s observations about the dim state of relations between the judicial and
legislative branches, the starting point for this article, are not encouraging. Many (and judges
especially) urge that greater “education” is the panacea. According to this view, if the public is
to have confidence in the judiciary, serious and wide-ranging pedagogical reforms are in order:
the public must be informed (and kept knowledgeable) about the role of the judiciary, its place in
our government, the rules governing the conduct of judges, and so on.180 With apologies to
deliberative democracy enthusiasts,181 I am skeptical of this claim. Advocates of this type of
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Another question, “Should congressional threats of removal against the judiciary be of any concern?”, is also
worth considering. However, since the aim of this article is to establish that such threats are increasing in
prevalence and that the state of relations between Congress and the judiciary will continue to deteriorate as a result,
that question will not be addressed here.
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See, e.g., Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Criticism of
Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 727 (1997) (“[T]he time has come for the justice system insiders to take a much
more aggressive role in the area of public education and public relations. We need to find ways to work with the
media, with the public at large, and with the school population.”); Hon. Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Game:
Public Perceptions of the Judiciary, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 909, 913 (1996); Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Courtroom With a View: Building Judicial Independence With Public Participation, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. &
DISP. RESOL. 13, 14 (2000); Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial
Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1064 (2002) (former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice
White contends that the public must become more active in “gathering information about judicial performance from
the citizen’s point of view”). Justice O’Connor seems to advocate a didactic approach toward legislators: “Try to
make a friend out of Congress . . . . Try to help them understand the needs of judges. It’s much harder to turn a cold
shoulder on someone you know.” See supra note 2.
181

Much has been written about the role that public deliberation and debate plays (or should play) in the democratic
process. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY AND
DEMOCRACY 17, 21 (Thomas Christiano ed. 2003): “The deliberative conception of democracy is centered around
an ideal of political justification. According to this ideal, justification of the exercise of collective political power is
to proceed on the basis of a free public reasoning among equals . . . . Not simply a form of politics, democracy, on
the deliberative view, is a framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among
equal citizens – by providing favorable conditions for participation, association, and expression – and ties the
authorization to exercise public power (and the exercise itself) to such discussion – by establishing a framework
ensuring the responsibility and accountability of political power to it . . . .”; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, ch. 4 (2003). Judge Posner identifies and examines two democratic models:
“Concept I Democracy” is the deliberative model set forth by Professor Cohen; and “Concept II Democracy” – the
model he favors and believes best describes American democracy today – which is characterized by a more realistic
and pragmatically oriented view of public self-interest and the elitism of elected officials in the democratic process.
Id. at 143-145.
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public education are grossly oversimplifying matters. There are parallels with other social
institutions and professions (medicine, the law, government, education, business, etc.) that make
this plain. I and surely many others recognize that the siege of public criticism is not endemic to
the judiciary alone (though it may be more nocent to the judiciary than other institutions). Is the
answer to the public crisis of confidence in its physicians (and the resultant prevalence of
medical malpractice lawsuits, exorbitant insurance costs, and the other problems afflicting
modern medical care) to “educate” people about what doctors do, or about the basics of
molecular genetics or neuropathology, or, even less plausibly, about the sundry and intricate
possibilities attending the various proposals for a viable American health care system? Surely
not. Such an educational program is both impracticable and of questionable desirability.182 The
public, after all, has many other valuable pursuits to occupy its time (earning a living and
consuming goods (thereby contributing to the health of the economy), raising and educating
children, enjoying well-earned leisure moments, and so on).183 The type of public education that
would truly make a difference (i.e., that would meaningfully inform the non-physician public
about medicine and keep it sufficiently knowledgeable and in step with the rapidly changing face

Interesting as these arguments are for the place of communal deliberation and public criticism in the
strengthening (or weakening) of the judiciary, see, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, ch. 3 (2001) (describing the inherent tension between judicial review and the
deliberative model), their examination must await a future article.
182

It also “hopelessly exaggerates the moral and intellectual capacities, not only of the average person but also of the
average official (including judge) and even of the political theorists who seek to tutor the people and the officials.”
POSNER, supra note 181, at 144. Furthermore, it underestimates the complexity of the subject matter. In order to
achieve anything approaching a comprehensive understanding of the social concerns attending any of the fields
listed, enormous and sustained study is necessary.
183

See Richard Posner, Smooth Sailing: Democracy Doesn’t Need Deliberation Day. If Spending a Day Talking
About Issues Were a Worthwhile Activity, You Wouldn’t Have to Pay Voters to Do It, 2004-FEB LEGAL AFF. 41, 42
(2004): “I am unclear about what collective deliberation would add to our political system, but I am pretty clear
about what it would subtract. It would subtract from the time people have for their other pursuits – personal,
familial, and commercial.”
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of medicine) is entirely inconsistent with “career imperatives and the tugs of self-interest.”184
These are the modern realities of constant time pressures, limited attention spans, economic
necessities, and a (perhaps justifiable) lack of interest in matters abstruse and dull. The same can
be said of other institutions. Is the solution to the public’s lack of faith in its elected
representatives more civics lessons, political theory classes, or disquisitions on the internecine
workings of government? Not only are such solutions wholly unworkable, but they also ask far
too much of a public that is often indifferent to these issues and fully occupied in its own
pursuits. It is rational choice – not lack of educational opportunity – that keeps the public
relatively uninformed.185
“More speech” – that is, a continuation and/or increase in the quantity of judicial
criticism – say others.186 In a similar vein, some call for the wholesale relaxation of restraints on
judicial speech, thereby permitting and encouraging judges to participate freely in the explosion
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POSNER, supra note 181, at 140.
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See Somin, supra note 156: “So long as becoming an informed voter is the only reason for acquiring political
knowledge most ordinary citizens will remain rationally ignorant.” See also POSNER, supra note 181, at 152: “With
so little at stake for the individual voter, who cannot expect actually to swing the election by his vote . . . he is prey
to all those cognitive quirks that psychologists are busy documenting in their experimental subjects. There is not
enough at stake for him to make the effort required to resist taking the path of least resistance, the path of lazy
thought.” It is therefore rational choice, and the reality that most people simply don’t care to know (and will not
benefit from knowing) the names and functions of the hundreds of, say, administrative agencies within the
Executive branch, that perpetuates public ignorance.
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See Bogus, supra note 146, at 397. Bogus is certainly in good company in this belief. See, e.g., Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (using the marketplace of ideas metaphor that has become the cornerstone of freedom of
speech doctrine); Bridges, 314 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Judges as persons, or courts as institutions,
are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions . . . . [J]udges must be kept
mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed
with candor however blunt.”); Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence By Criticism of Judges –
A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729 (1997): “The problem is not that too many
lawyers are publicly criticizing judges. Unfortunately, too few lawyers are willing to do so . . . .”; Howard M.
Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 385 (2004): “Free speech demands that the
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of critical dialogue (polylogue is more accurate).187 There is undeniable intrinsic value in
discussion and the exchange of views in arriving at practical solutions to local problems of
limited scope.188 In this case, however, more criticism, whether from the mouths of judges,
lawyers, the media, or the general public, is no salve. It is a “highly exaggerated faith” that
believes that speech, in whatever form and to whatever degree, is either harmless or always to
the good.189 Just the reverse is true. The enormous increase in speech (through, for example, the
medium of Internet web sites and chat rooms) has only served to balkanize and polarize
positions, as individuals can access with facility viewpoints that move them toward “extreme
points in line with their initial tendencies.”190 More criticism will beget more hostility toward
and from the judiciary (as judges become more eager and able to speak publicly and
uninhibitedly), as well as less respect for the institution – that, plainly, is the lesson to be drawn
from our present state.191 Already the irritant of overabundant criticism has only exacerbated the

greatest amount of information, thoughts, ideas, and opinions be disseminated from the greatest number of sources .
. . . Speech is valuable because it informs people and persuades them . . . .”
187

See, e.g., Hon. Stephen J. Fortunato, On a Judge’s Duty to Speak Extrajudicially: Rethinking the Strategy of
Silence, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 679, 681 (1999) (arguing that judges should respond aggressively and publicly to
“baseless attacks on their integrity”); Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa, Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 2381, 2382, 2385 (1997) (observing that “[c]ommentators’ views enjoy the luxurious freedom to
be casually, even carelessly quick, while those of jurists must be studiously deliberative,” and therefore concluding
that “[o]n balance, the stakes are too high and the turf too valuable for judges to sit by silently and complacently
cede the discussion to a few populists with challengeable methodologies or debatable agendas”).
188

See POSNER, supra note 181, at 137.
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See White, supra note 154, at 813.
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L.A. Powe, Jr., Disease and Cure? Republic.Com by Cass Sunstein, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1947, 1952 (2003) (book
review). Professor Powe continues: “Sunstein’s remedy is wonderfully Brandeisian: more speech, speech rebutting
speech. But the concept of group polarization is premised on the fact that counterspeech is not accessed or else
doesn’t get through. The Internet may make acquisition of alternative information easier, but this doesn’t guarantee
that the information will be accessed even if there is an offered link on the page.”
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Canon 3B(9) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct contemplates, at least with respect to pending matters, the
necessity of keeping judges out of the fray of just such intercourse: “A judge shall not, while a proceeding is
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chafed relationships between governmental branches, as well as between the judiciary and the
public; it has also produced greater opportunities for political manipulation by the legislature in
the form of threats of removal. Is it reasonable to believe that greater quantities of criticism
would produce the opposite result? Neither of these answers – greater education or more speech
– presents a workable or likely solution to the problem of the intense friction between the
legislative and judicial branches.
IV.

Conclusion
I have no feasible prescription for the ailment I have described. It is too late in the day –

some sixty years after Bridges, and with the First Amendment basking in the fullness of its
strength as one of the holiest of constitutional holies192 – to argue that limiting or stifling

pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its
outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or
hearing.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(9). One of the reasons for prohibiting judicial speech lies in
the corrosive effect of such speech to the judiciary’s perceived legitimacy.
192

LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (1986)
(observing that the concept of free speech is one of our “foremost cultural symbols”); White, supra note 154, at 811.
Professor White offers the following convincing account of the common, horrified reaction to any proposal remotely
suggesting that some speech may not be worthwhile:
Let me begin by asking you to reflect on you own response to what I have just said about certain strains of
speech in our culture of which I disapprove . . . . If you are like me, a side of you will have reacted very
strongly, something like this: “Who are you to use the word junk of any speech. As Americans we are
committed to our liberties, to our liberty of speech above all. The explosion of speech in our public spaces
is an inherently good thing, not a bad one, even if you don’t like it. What kind of elitist are you anyway?”
Some such response . . . is I think deeply built into our minds and our culture. It is an instinctive reaction
so well established among us as to be a kind of second nature. At the faintest signs of what looks like
censorship or even disapproval of any form of speech we are likely to find ourselves resisting strongly. We
boldly say that we are willing to pay the price of too much speech – and of trivial or even dangerous speech
– and for several very good reasons: in order to avoid the evil of government censorship; in order to make
truly democratic politics possible; and in order to respect the right of the individual to form her mind, and
her relations with others, in such manner as seems to her best . . . .This is a key part of what it means to be
an American . . . . This is the position we instinctively resort to when someone challenges the idea that
speech should be free.
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criticism of the judiciary is the answer.193 We arrive, then, at an impasse. More judicial
criticism (that is, the status quo) will not improve judicial/legislative relations; an imposed
system of prior restraints against judicial criticism would be both politically intolerable in the
present climate and would do little to shore up the perceived legitimacy of the courts; and any
meaningful public education is impracticable and possibly undesirable. The conclusion must be
that further deterioration of the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches is
inevitable – sacrificed at the altar of the First Amendment and the public worship of limitless
critical exchange. Congressional threats of removal against federal judges, merely the
legislator’s opportunistic exploitation of the culture of criticism, will play an increasingly
prominent role in that breakdown.
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Justice Brandeis’ admonition that “enforced silence” is not a viable option except in the most dire of
circumstances has reached legendary stature. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377.
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